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Doe v. University of Michigan:               
Free Speech on Campus 25 Years Later 
LEN NIEHOFF* 
I would like to use as the launching pad for my remarks today 
the 1989 federal district court decision in Doe v. University of Mich-
igan.1 Doe is the seminal case on campus speech codes and it just 
recently passed its twenty-fifth anniversary.2 I thought this sympo-
sium would be a good occasion to look back, see where we were, 
assess where we are, and ask whether we have made any progress. 
Spoiler alert: the news is not good. 
As you will recall, in Doe a federal district court held that a pol-
icy that the University of Michigan had adopted in response to a 
number of racially charged incidents on campus ran afoul of the First 
Amendment.3 As legal precedent, I do not think that Doe offers 
many extraordinary insights. The challenged policy was indeed 
overbroad and vague and it was “dead on arrival” at the federal 
courthouse in Detroit. We do not need to perform any elaborate au-
topsies to confirm the fact or cause of death. 
So why should we care about Doe? I think there are several rea-
sons. First, Doe was an early excursion into territories and tensions 
that have now become familiar. The case was therefore decided be-
fore these controversies had grown encrusted with some of the fram-
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor from Practice, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., J.D., 
University of Michigan. This article is a modestly revised and annotated version 
of remarks made during the February 2016 University of Miami Law Review 
Symposium titled “The Constitution on Campus: Do Students Shed Their Rights 
at the Schoolhouse Gates?” The author thanks the University of Miami Law Re-
view for the invitation to participate and thanks Elana Zeide for her helpful sug-
gestions regarding this presentation. 
 1 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 2 See generally id. 
 3 See id. at 866–67. 
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ing, language, and concepts that burden them today. Like many pre-
liminary experiments, Doe comes to us with a kind of purity—purity 
we have been unable to sustain. 
Second, although the policy in question in Doe was badly 
flawed, it seems clear that the University of Michigan acted in good 
faith. The issues that the University faced were unsettling and sig-
nificant, demanding some kind of response.4 Similarly, it seems 
clear that the plaintiff acted in good faith. If I had been teaching at 
the University when that policy was in place, I would have had se-
rious concerns as well. These days, when those on each side of the 
debate are so eager to caricature those on the other as clueless, or 
even villainous, it seems refreshing to consider a case where both 
sides had a point. 
Third, the passing of twenty-five years provides an occasion to 
call the question: are we thinking about these issues now better than 
we thought about them then? Granted, progress in addressing con-
flicting values tends to come more haltingly than we would like. But 
it does seem fair to expect some forward movement over a quarter-
century span. So I ask: have we seen any? 
I have three theses. The first is that since Doe was decided, we 
have indeed seen significant change in how we think about and dis-
cuss the conflicting values of speech and equality on campus. The 
second is that the change is overwhelmingly for the worse. The third 
is that things are very unlikely to get better anytime soon. 
It is a grim and discouraging assessment I bring you. Nor is it 
likely to win me any new friends or, perhaps, any additional invita-
tions to symposia. As you will see, I believe that the blame for this 
situation lies with both sides of this debate. I think that everyone has 
had a turn at the switch in creating this train wreck. I think that ev-
erybody has tossed some fuel on this dumpster fire. 
Before we get too far into our current disarray, however, let us 
remind ourselves what happened in Doe. 
                                                                                                             
 4 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854. 
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I. WHAT HAPPENED IN DOE? 
The University of Michigan community was rocked in the late 
1980s when a number of racist incidents occurred on campus, cul-
minating in a rash in early 1987.5 In one of these incidents, an un-
known person or persons distributed an anonymous flier around the 
campus that used a series of deeply offensive racial epithets regard-
ing Blacks and declared “open season” on them.6 In another, a stu-
dent disc jockey at an on-campus radio station allowed racist jokes 
to be broadcast.7 When members of the University community 
demonstrated in protest to these incidents, someone suspended a Ku 
Klux Klan uniform from a dormitory window.8 
The University’s president issued a formal statement condemn-
ing these events.9 The chair of the Michigan State House of Repre-
sentatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Higher Education—the 
legislative body charged with overseeing the public funding of the 
University—conducted public hearings regarding these incidents 
and the problem of racism on the Ann Arbor campus.10 In the course 
of those hearings, forty-eight speakers addressed the subcommittee 
before an audience of hundreds.11 They had uniformly negative 
things to say about the University’s response to these incidents and 
about the campus climate for minorities more generally.12 
                                                                                                             
 5 See id. at 854. The community’s response was almost certainly shaped not 
just by the nature of the incidents, but by the community’s strong sense of pro-
gressive—even activist—identity. On May 22, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson 
had delivered his “Great Society” speech in Michigan Stadium. See HOWARD H. 
PECKHAM, THE MAKING OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN: 1817–1992 279 
(Margaret L. Steneck & Nicholas H. Steneck eds., 175th anniversary ed. 1994). 
In the mid-1960s, faculty and student protests over the Vietnam War were com-
mon and the Students for a Democratic Society emerged on campus. See id. at 
279–81, 291–94. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Black Action Movement 
was formed to advocate for the rights of African Americans. See id. at 294–95. 
The notion that overtly racist conduct could occur on the Ann Arbor campus 
seemed wholly inconsistent with this history. 
 6 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. 
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The University came under tremendous pressure to do some-
thing and to do it promptly: the subcommittee chair threatened to 
hold up appropriations to the University;13 a campus anti-discrimi-
nation group announced plans to sue the institution;14 and a national 
civil rights leader weighed in on the controversy.15 The University 
came forward with a detailed plan to address concerns about racism 
on campus, which included a commitment to adopt an “anti-racial 
harassment” policy.16 
Adoption of the policy took more than a year, in part because of 
a transition in presidential leadership and in part because the docu-
ment went through a dozen drafts with input from a variety of Uni-
versity constituencies.17 Along the way, some individuals raised 
concerns about the impact such a policy could have on free speech.18 
But the interim president expressed the view that “just as an individ-
ual cannot shout ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater and then claim immu-
nity from prosecution for causing a riot on the basis of exercising 
his rights of free speech,” individuals within a university community 
cannot make “discriminatory remarks” that “detract from the neces-
sary educational climate of a campus” and then “‘claim immunity 
from a campus disciplinary proceeding.”19 
                                                                                                             
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See id. at 855. 
 18 See id. 
 19 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The reference to the permissible 
prohibition against falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater comes from Jus-
tice Holmes’s opinion in Schenck v. United States (“The most stringent protection 
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing panic.”). 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A number of critics have observed that 
Justice Holmes’s analogy is flawed and has been overused and misapplied. See, 
e.g., Trevor Timm, It’s Time to Stop Using the ‘Fire in a Crowded Theater’ Quote, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012
/11/its-time-to-stop-using-the-fire-in-a-crowded-theater-quote/264449/; Alan M. 
Dershowitz, Shouting “Fire!”, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 1989), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/magazine/archive/1989/01/shouting-fire/376334/?preview=TC1KIGCW
tDkccr6oMCz5YC0PfVI. 
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The final version of the policy was complex and elaborate, 
reaching very broadly.20 Among the various campus spaces, it ap-
plied to classrooms, libraries, laboratories, and recreational and 
study centers.21 In these areas, persons were subject to disciplinary 
action on a number of grounds delineated by the policy, including 
engaging in speech that “stigmatized” or “victimized” someone 
based on a characteristic like race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual ori-
entation.22 Sanctions depended on the gravity of the offense and 
were potentially severe.23 
The University also issued an “interpretive guide” that purported 
to be an authority on the policy and that offered examples of speech 
that the University deemed discriminatory or harassing. 24 The ex-
amples were troubling for a variety of reasons. A number of them 
involved speech that appeared to be protected under the First 
Amendment, such as making a negative comment about someone 
else’s “religious beliefs,” or expressing the opinion that women are 
not as capable as men in a particular field of endeavor.25 Other ex-
amples did not seem to directly relate to the underlying policy, such 
as making a negative comment about someone else’s “physical ap-
pearance” apart from the person’s race, ethnicity, or gender.26 
Indeed, the guide appeared to aggravate, rather than mitigate, the 
vagueness of the underlying policy.27 Assume, for example, that a 
                                                                                                             
 20 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856–58. A comprehensive description of the pol-
icy is set forth in Doe. See id. Because much of the detail about the policy is 
irrelevant to this discussion, I provide only a brief summary of the policy. 
 21 See id at 856. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See id. at 857. Sanctions, of which one or more could be imposed, included: 
“(1) formal reprimand; (2) community service; (3) class attendance; (4) restitu-
tion; (5) removal from University housing; (6) suspension from specific courses 
and activities; (7) suspension; [and] (8) expulsion.” Id. 
 24 See id. at 857–58. 
 25 See id. at 858. 
 26 See id. (The example stated that a student would be considered a “harasser” 
when “You [the student] comment in a derogatory way about a particular person 
or group’s physical appearance or sexual orientation, or their cultural origins, or 
religious belief.”). 
 27 See id. at 858 (“It was not clear whether each of these actions would subject 
a student to sanctions, although the title of the section suggest[ed] that they 
would.”). The interpretive guide was ultimately withdrawn in the winter of 1989. 
See id. 
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male student said to his male roommate: “You really should shave 
off that pathetic excuse for a beard.” Does this qualify as a “derog-
atory” comment about the “physical appearance” of a “particular 
person” that renders the student subject to discipline under the anti-
harassment policy?28 If it does, then does that make any sense? If it 
does not, then how would the student—or an administrator charged 
with applying the policy—know that the policy does not apply? 
At the time the policy was adopted, “John Doe” was a psychol-
ogy graduate student at the University.29 Doe taught courses that ex-
plored controversial theories that he worried some students might 
view as “sexist.”30 This included theories that men, because of bio-
logical differences between the sexes, may in general be better than 
women at certain kinds of mental tasks.31 Doe was concerned that 
his teaching would violate the policy and result in disciplinary ac-
tion.32 As a result, he sued the University and the case was assigned 
to Judge Avern Cohn of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan.33 
The University challenged Doe’s standing to sue on the basis 
that his concern was hypothetical, and accordingly, no actual case 
or controversy existed for the court to decide.34 To engage in a bit 
of understatement, this argument did not sit well with Judge Cohn. 
Judge Cohn acknowledged that he might agree with the University 
if he had nothing before him except the language of the policy, but 
that was not the case.35 
Judge Cohn pointed to the interpretive guide as a reason for be-
lieving that Doe’s concerns were not entirely speculative.36 After all, 
the guide included an example of harassment—a student who opines 
about the superiority of men within a particular field—that seemed 
closely analogous to the classroom subject matter that worried 
Doe.37 Judge Cohn noted that on three documented occasions, the 
                                                                                                             
 28 See id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. at 860. 
 32 See id. at 858. 
 33 Id. at 852. 
 34 Id. at 858. 
 35 Id. at 859. 
 36 See id. at 860. 
 37 See id. 
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University had in fact enforced the policy, or threatened to enforce 
it, against students based on their classroom speech.38 Judge Cohn 
did not just reject the University’s objection to Doe’s standing—he 
declared that it “served only to diminish the credibility of the Uni-
versity’s argument on the merits because it appeared that it sought 
to avoid coming to grips with the constitutionality of the policy.”39 
Having disposed of the standing issue, Judge Cohn turned to the 
merits of the policy.40 After a long and thorough analysis41 (which I 
do not need to recount in detail here, but which I commend to your 
attention), he concluded that the policy was unconstitutionally over-
broad and that a number of critical terms in the document—such as 
“stigmatize” and “victimize”—rendered the policy unconstitution-
ally vague.42 In the course of the litigation, the University had with-
drawn some provisions of the policy—and the guide in its entirety—
but these maneuvers did not impress Judge Cohn.43 
Indeed, Judge Cohn had several grievances with the University 
and cataloged them twice, once at the end of the Doe decision and 
again in a law review article he later wrote.44 One contention may in 
retrospect strike you as ironic in light of recent events.45 Toward the 
end of the Doe decision, Judge Cohn suggested that in thinking 
about its policy, the University might have learned a great deal by 
looking to the experiences of another great university—Yale Uni-
versity.46 I am not sure that, today, anyone on either side of the de-
bate thinks that the perfect solutions to these problems reside in New 
Haven.47 
                                                                                                             
 38 See id. at 861 (“At least one student was subject to a formal hearing because 
he stated in the context of a social work research class that he believed that ho-
mosexuality was a disease that could be psychologically treated.”). 
 39 Id. at 858–59. 
 40 See id. at 861–67. 
 41 See generally id. 
 42 See id. at 867. 
 43 See id. at 858, 860. 
 44 See id. at 867–69. See generally Hon. Avern Cohn, Doe v. University of 
Michigan: A Somewhat Personal View, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1313 (1991). 
 45 See, e.g., infra note 47. 
 46 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867–68. 
 47 For a discussion of recent controversies on the Yale campus, see, e.g., Da-
vid Cole, The Trouble at Yale, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2016/01/14/the-trouble-at-yale/. 
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But here’s the point. Although Judge Cohn found the policy un-
constitutional and had a variety of grievances with the institution,48 
his opinion reflects genuine respect for the University’s concerns 
and for the complexity of the problem before it.49 Indeed, the first 
sentence in Doe reads: “It is an unfortunate fact of our constitutional 
system that the ideals of freedom and equality are often in conflict. 
The difficult and sometimes painful task of our political and legal 
institutions is to mediate the appropriate balance between these two 
competing values.”50 In the same spirit, the opinion concludes by 
recognizing the University’s “obligation to ensure equal educational 
opportunities for all of its students” and expressing sympathy with 
that goal.51 Indeed, the lawyer who represented Doe—Professor 
Robert Sedler of the Wayne Law School—voiced similar views in a 
law review article that he published about the case.52 
So look at where Doe left us twenty-five years ago. It acknowl-
edged the value of both free expression and equality.53 It recognized 
that collisions between these two values were inevitable.54 It under-
stood that mediating the conflicts between these values was hid-
eously complicated.55 It grasped that people of good faith would 
make mistakes in trying to work through those tensions.56 Doe was, 
in many respects, the perfect starting point for a civil, informed, re-
spectful, productive dialogue, all toward the end of dramatically im-
proved campus environments. 
Well, so much for that. 
II. WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
Doe arose from concerns about a racially hostile campus envi-
ronment.57 Some data strongly suggests that the situation nationally 
                                                                                                             
 48 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867–69. 
 49 See id. at 853, 868. 
 50 Id. at 853. 
 51 Id. at 868. 
 52 See Robert A. Sedler, Doe v. University of Michigan and Campus Bans on 
“Racist Speech”: The View from Within, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1325, 1326, 1329, 
1336–42 (1991). 
 53 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 853. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 868. 
 57 See supra notes 5–8. 
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has gotten considerably worse.58 The number of race-based harass-
ment incidents reported to the Department of Education rose dra-
matically from 2009 to 2014 and studies estimate that only about 
13% of such incidents are reported to campus authorities.59 Further-
more, studies suggest that the problem has grown worse as affirma-
tive action policies have become less available as a tool, leading to 
stagnation or even declines in campus diversity.60 There is some 
irony in this because one of the suggestions offered by Professor 
Sedler in response to the Doe decision was that universities should 
focus less on speech codes and more on using affirmative action 
policies to admit racially diverse student bodies.61 
In any event, there is certainly an increased awareness of such 
incidents. Social media platforms have facilitated constant and 
widespread communication about these experiences. Consider, for 
example, the #BBUM movement at the University of Michigan, 
where Black students used Twitter to describe the challenges they 
faced on campus—a movement that drew national attention.62 
This increased consciousness also has to do with a shifting un-
derstanding of how harassment, discrimination, and marginalization 
happen. For example, we have a better sense now than we did in 
                                                                                                             
 58 See Brandon Griggs, Do U.S. Colleges Have a Race Problem?, CNN (Nov. 
10, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/10/us/racism-college-cam-
puses-protests-missouri/. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See, e.g., Press Release, Higher Educ. Res. Inst., Underrepresented Stu-
dents Experience More Racial Discrimination at Low-Diversity Institutions, Ac-
cording to Study, https://heri.ucla.edu/briefs/urmbriefpressrelease.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2017) (“Underrepresented college students at low-diversity institu-
tions reported more incidents of stereotyping, discrimination and harassment on 
campus . . . .[T]he survey shows that more students reveal these experiences when 
asked about specific overt and subtle forms of discrimination on campus.”). 
 61 See Sedler, supra note 52, at 1330 (“In regard to minority students, the 
university can best promote equality of educational opportunity by making a 
strong commitment to ‘affirmative action,’ thereby enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of 
minority students, and by hiring a reasonable number of minority faculty and ad-
ministrators.”). 
 62 See Rhonesha Byng, #BBUM Hashtag Sparks Dialogue About Diversity at 
the University of Michigan, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/20/bbum-university-of-michigan-black-stu-
dents_n_4310790.html. 
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1989 of how even inadvertent “micro-aggressions” can disrupt a stu-
dent’s learning experience.63 In 1987, we knew that the Ku Klux 
Klan uniform hung from the dormitory window at the University of 
Michigan was a racist act,64 just as in 2015 we knew that the noose 
strung around the statue of James Meredith at the University of Mis-
sissippi was a racist act.65 But today we also have a much more re-
fined view of the scope of the problem, and it turns out to be even 
more daunting than we understood twenty-five years ago. 
Nor are these dynamics exclusive to racial issues. The most re-
cent data regarding the number of sexual assaults on our nation’s 
campuses are shocking.66 In 1989, the concept of a “campus date 
rape” was still relatively new.67 Twenty-five years later, we have a 
much better understanding of the extent of gender-based victimiza-
tion. Around the issue of trigger warnings, we are engaged in a de-
bate about how to deal pedagogically with the statistical reality that 
one or more of our students may still be suffering under the trauma 
of such an experience.68 
Our universities have serious work to do and we need to have 
serious conversations to get it done. But serious, informed conver-
sations on these topics are hard to come by. The groups and individ-
                                                                                                             
 63 See Alexandra Svokos, College Campuses Are Full of Subtle Racism and 
Sexism, Study Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:22 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/12/microaggressions-college-racism-sex-
ism_n_6457106.html. 
 64 See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 
1989). 
 65 Susan Svrlgua, Former Ole Miss Student Pleads Guilty to Hanging Noose 




 66 See generally, Alyssa Peterson & Ivy Yan, Statistics on Gender-Based Vi-
olence, KNOW YOUR IX, http://knowyourix.org/statistics/ (last visited Jan. 16, 
2017). 
 67 See Deirdre Carmody, Increasing Rapes on Campus Spur Colleges to Fight 
Back, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/01/us/in-
creasing-rapes-on-campus-spur-colleges-to-fight-back.html?pagewanted=all. 
 68 See Jesse Singal, Is There Any Evidence Trigger Warnings Are Actual a 
Big Deal, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 6, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/
2015/12/are-trigger-warnings-actually-widespread-at-all.html. 
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uals who raise these issues are belittled as wimps, weaklings, whin-
ers, and snowflakes. Calls for greater awareness, sensitivity, and ac-
tion are met with accusations of “political correctness,” a phrase that 
had not yet emerged into full use in 1989 and one that I would hap-
pily send into eternal perdition, being, as it is, a lazy-minded label 
that people substitute for an argument. We have come a long way 
from the balance and civility of Doe, and it is to nowhere good. 
Furthermore, all too often no conversation about these topics can 
be conducted because discourse is shut down—in the name of free 
speech. A concern is raised about how to deal with speech that of-
fends someone to the point of disrupting her ability to learn. We are 
told, however, that we cannot even air the concern and try to figure 
out how to address it because freedom of speech stands in the way. 
The First Amendment, the grand midwife of ideas, is now routinely 
used to abort them. 
Of course, those on the other side of the issue have not served 
the conversation well, either. Social media platforms have played a 
role here, too, because they allow for the airing of grievances that 
are serious, thoughtful, and legitimate, but also for those that are 
petty, self-absorbed, or contrived. Those who “tweet” before they 
think may make themselves into easy objects of parody and discover 
they have become inadvertent co-conspirators in the trivialization of 
their concerns. 
And we see on this side, too, the paradoxical impulse to silence 
people in the service of the First Amendment. When you think that 
someone has no right to photograph your protest because of freedom 
of speech, you are confused.69 When you think freedom of speech 
gives you the right to physically block them from doing so, you are 
deeply confused.70 When you think freedom of speech gives you the 
right to call for “muscle” to intervene, you are dangerously con-
fused.71 
Those who seek to restrict speech often fall subject to a pseudo-
Newtonian principle that I call “Niehoff’s First Law of the First 
                                                                                                             
 69 See, e.g., Austin Huguelet & Daniel Victor, ‘I Need Some Muscle’: Mis-
souri Activists Block Journalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/11/10/us/university-missouri-protesters-block-journalists-press-free-
dom.html. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
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Amendment”: “For every action, there is an unequal and opposite 
overreaction.” We as human beings tend to think that big problems 
call for even bigger solutions. So of course the policy at issue in Doe 
turned out to be too broad and too vague—as do many such policies. 
After all, it is counter-intuitive to think you could address a signifi-
cant and complicated problem in any other way. But that “other 
way”—that narrow and cautious way—is precisely how First 
Amendment jurisprudence requires us to think about our policy re-
sponses. 
Perhaps you can see why I am skeptical that things will get better 
anytime soon. Both sides of the debate have settled into certain 
framings, narratives, and labels—and they appear to have become 
perversely comfortable there. Of course, a highly effective mecha-
nism for making comfortable people uncomfortable does exist. 
It is called freedom of speech. 
But, as I say, whichever side you are on, the other side does not 
get to use it. 
